G for George
G-George flew 89 sorties over occupied Europe with No.460 Squadron during a period when most operational Lancasters were shot down before they had even reached 20. In 107,085 total sorties flown by Lancasters, 2,687 went missing. Remarkably, G-George brought its crew home alive from every operation it flew on.
Members of the crew of “G” for George, the veteran Lancaster aircraft of 460 Squadron RAAF in the UK, in front of their aircraft. The crew are preparing for either the second last or last flown operation on the 10 or 24 April 1944 before G George was retired from operational service. Left to right back row: 424050 Flight Sergeant (F Sgt) A G Brown, Sydney, NSW; 426771 Flying Officer (FO) R G Sampson, Mackay, QLD; 401614 FO J A Critchley DFC, Melbourne, VIC; Sergeant (Sgt) Shaw, RAF, Ramsgate, England; Sgt Knott, RAF, Walthamstow, England. Front row left to right; 426484 F Sgt M L Armstrong, Brisbane, QLD; Sgt Starkey, RAF. This aircraft has completed ninety operations. Source: AWM
The Strategic Bomber Campaign
On most of the 1,886 nights between 1 March 1940 and 31 April 1945 (and on many of the days, too) RAF Bomber Command sent aircraft to attack targets of strategic value to the German war effort. The effort required to do so was immense; the destruction, in the end, practically complete; the cost in aircrew lives lost, tragic with over 50% of all aircrew killed, wounded or captured; the strategic effect – at least in result-based terms, debatable; the morality, obscure; the heroism and sacrifice required of the men who flew those operations; beyond words.
Bomber Command flew a total of 364,484** operational sorties during the Second World war and in doing so 79,281 of its aircrew were killed, 8,403 were wounded and 9,838 became prisoners of war. By mid-1944 Bomber Command comprised 80 squadrons in ten groups, and a total of 126 different squadrons saw service in the Command at some point during the conflict.
In September 1941 the British Air Staff produced a paper on a proposed strategy to be employed against Germany in Europe which included the following;
The ultimate aim of an attack on a town area is to break the morale of the population which occupies it. To ensure this, we must achieve two things: first, we must make the town physically uninhabitable and, secondly, we must make the people conscious of constant personal danger. The immediate aim, is therefore, twofold, namely, to produce (i) destruction and (ii) fear of death.
Two years later in October 1943 and with mounting – bordering unacceptably high – casualties in his command requiring justification, as well as a public discomfort with the strategy’s aim, Bomber Command’s Chief, Air Chief Marshall Sir Arthur “Bomber” Harris advocated openness to the public on the purpose of the relentless bombing campaign and its associated losses:
…the aim of the Combined Bomber Offensive…should be unambiguously stated [as] the destruction of German cities, the killing of German workers, and the disruption of civilised life throughout Germany… the destruction of houses, public utilities, transport and lives, the creation of a refugee problem on an unprecedented scale, and the breakdown of morale both at home and at the battle fronts by fear of extended and intensified bombing, are accepted and intended aims of our bombing policy. They are not by-products of attempts to hit factories. [Ed. emphasis mine].
Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief (AOC-in-C) RAF Bomber Command
In the pursuit of this the RAF dropped a total of 964,644 tons of bombs on Germany and its forces; it attacked every German city with a population of 500,000 or greater – and many of much lesser size; attempted to destroy Berlin completely; destroyed, completely, an average of 55% of the 25 largest cities in Germany including 83% of Bochum and 75% of Hamburg (and smaller cities weren’t spared, Wesel was 97% destroyed); and killed or wounded approximately 1 million German civilians.
The effect of this unprecedented destruction of a combatant’s home infrastructure and population on the outcome of the war will likely always be debated. The morality of bombing civilians viewed through the prism of 80 years distance in a new century, one where smart bombs don’t miss (they do), civilian casualties measured even in single digits are considered too high (they are) and where those deaths are rigorously investigated (as they should be), and alleged transgressions – war crimes – of even the most lauded soldiers are frequently inquired/prosecuted (again, as they should be).
What is not debatable is the data. While the well documented German increase in production of tanks and aircraft through the major portion of the bombing campaign is frequently cited as prima facia evidence by those that claim the campaign was a failure – and was therefore immoral – there is more to consider when determining the value and effect the Strategic Bombing Campaign had on the outcome of the war.
The real importance of the air war consisted in the fact that it opened a second front long before the invasion in Europe… Defense against air attacks required the production of thousands of anti-aircraft guns, the stockpiling of tremendous quantities of ammunition all over the country, and holding in readiness hundreds of thousands of soldiers, who in addition had to stay in position by their guns, often totally inactive, for months at a time.
Albert Speer, Germany’s Minister for Armaments
By January 1943 around 1,000 Luftwaffe night fighters were committed to the defence of the Reich against Bomber Command’s campaign; this in addition to the day fighters required to defend against the USAAF daylight bombing campaign. Almost 9,000 of the finest anti-tank weapon on either side, the 88mm (plus another 25,000 light flak guns) were committed to home defence as flak guns instead of on the battlefield fighting the Russians. At its peak Germany’s home defence required some 90,000 men – the equivalent of around six Infantry Divisions – to man these weapons and perhaps as much as a million more to clean up and rebuild the factories (which came first of course) and the civilian homes destroyed by the bombers.
By 1944 the bombing offensive was consuming 30% of Germany’s artillery production, 20% of its heavy shell production, 33% of its optical industry (required for aiming devices) and 50% of the country’s electro-technical output, all of which was effectively diverted to the bomber defence role instead of the battlefield.
There can be no doubt therefore that Bomber Command’s Strategic Bombing Campaign had a significant effect on Germany’s ability to wage war against the invading armies on both east and western fronts, and through so doing it ultimately made a major contribution to the Allied victory in May 1945.
At almost unimaginable cost.
No. 460 Squadron RAAF, No. 1 Group, RAF Bomber Command
One of 126 squadrons who served in RAF Bomber Command was No.460 Squadron RAAF, originally part of No.8 Group and then to No.1 Group. No. 460 gained distinction as it flew the most sorties (6,262) of any Australian bomber squadron and dropped more bomb tonnage (24,856 tons) than any squadron in the whole of Bomber Command. The squadron maintained the highest readiness rate of aircraft of any Bomber Command Squadron. It also lost the highest number of aircraft (188) and suffered the highest number of combat deaths (1,018 of whom 589 were Australian); the squadron was statistically wiped out five times over during its existence.
No. 460 Squadron came into existence on 15 November 1941 and was initially equipped with Wellington Mk.IV twin engine medium bombers. Based then at RAF Breighton they flew their first raid in March 1942 against the German city of Emden.
In August the Squadron reequipped with Handley Page Halifax’s but only three months later they again reequipped with Avro Lancaster Mks. I and III with which they finished the war. In May 1943 the Squadron made its final wartime move to RAF Binbrook in Lincolnshire, from where it began operations as part of the strategic bombing campaign against Germany.
In late 1943 and the first half of 1944, the squadron flew sorties in the Battle of Berlin as well as support for the invasion of Europe; its final raid was an attack on Adolf Hitler’s mountain retreat of Berchtesgaden on Anzac Day, 1945. In May 1945 the Squadron joined Operation Manna providing transportation of relief supplies to starving Dutch civilians. When the war ended in Europe, 460 Sqd. was designated as part of Tiger Force and was preparing to go into action as part of the Japanese home islands invasion when the war in the Pacific was brought to a close though the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
G-George, Avro Lancaster Mk.I W4783
460 Squadron’s most famous [aircraft] alumni is G-George, a veteran of 90 operations (though in fact its log book shows only 89) and one with the distinction that it brought its crew home safe from each one, even the 24 operations when it came back with flak damage.
Avro Lancaster W4387 was ordered in 1940 in a batch of 400 Lancaster B Mk I and Mk III aircraft. It was delivered to 460 Squadron RAAF on 27 October 1942 and assigned the call sign ‘G’ for George. Its first mission took place on 6 December 1942 against the Germany city of Mannheim and over the next 16 months and 90 operations a total of twenty seven different crews flew in George, though a majority of those were flown by only four; Flight Sergeant (Flt Sgt) J A Saint-Smith (13 operations denoted by the “saint” figure painted next to the bomb motive on the fuselage mission markings), Flt Sgt J Murray (13 operations which are those with the red bar which represented operations in support of the Russians – “All for Joe” ), Flying Officer Henderson (10 operations), and Pilot Officer H Carter (21 operations).
George’s longest operation was a ten hour trip to attack the Italian Naval base in La Spezia, Italy on 13 April 1943. Its last operation was a raid on Cologne, Germany on the night of 20/21 April 1944.
When George was retired from service it had completed more operations than almost any other aircraft in RAF Bomber Command. In June 1944 the Department of Air made it available for war museum purposes and after an extensive overhaul it left for Australia on 11 October 1944, flown by an all-Australian crew captained by Flight Lieutenant E A Hudson, DFC and Bar. Such was George’s fame by this time, it warranted newsreel coverage of its departure;
It arrived in Brisbane, Queensland on 8 November 1944 and the following day was received by 3 Aircraft Depot, Amberley where it was given RAAF registration number A66-2. In 1945 the aircraft toured the eastern states of Australia in connection with the Third Victory Loan until finally declared surplus and transferred to the Australian War Memorial.
Epilogue
According to its log book, Avro Lancaster B.I/III serial number W4783, 460 Squadron code G-George flew 89 operational sorties over occupied Europe at a time when most operational Lancasters were shot down before they reached even 20. Of the 107,085 total operational sorties flown by Lancasters to Germany during the campaign, 2,687 aircraft went missing. Not only did G-George come home after every one of its sorties, it brought home its full crew home alive as well.
In late April 1944 a new Lancaster, serial number ND630 was assigned the Squadron code G-George and it seems likely its crew(s) hoped that the good fortune enjoyed by the original George would continue with the new. Sadly this was not to be, and if anything it was quite the reverse; Only a few days later in fact, ND630 G-George was lost on one of its first operations during the night of 3/4 May over France with the entire crew KIA. NE116 was the next Lancaster coded G-George but it too was shot down just six weeks later on the night of 22/23 June on a sortie to Rheims in France with five of its seven man crew killed (the other two were able to parachute clear and evaded capture). Just a week later, ME793 which carried the code G2 was lost on an operation to Vaires in France, again with the entire crew KIA.
** Statistics quoted in this piece are from Wikipedia and have been used to demonstrate the scale of the Bomber Command strategic campaign as well as provide context for the article; as they are not from primary sources they should be treated as indicative only. See References and Credits for details.